

Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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FM USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2829

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

USMISSION NATO

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0400

EXDIS/SALT

DEPT ALSO PASS DOD

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E O 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJ: DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV'S STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 8, 1975
(SALT TWO - 813)

THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF OCTOBER 8, 1975

SEMENOV STATEMENT, OCTOBER 8, 1975

AT THE AUGUST 22, 1975 MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION
TABLED A NEW PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET SIDE FOR ARTICLE XIII
OF THE AGREEMENT BEING PREPARED---ON AN OBLIGATION NOT TO
TAKE ACTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW
AGREEMENT BEING WEAKENED OR CIRCUMVENED THROUGH A THIRD
STATE OR THIRD STATES, OR IN ANY OTHER WAY.

IN THE COURSE OF THE SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE OF VIEWS,
AT THE SEPTEMBER 5, 1975 MEETING AMONG OTHERS, THE USSR
DELEGATION CITED EXTENSIVE RATIONALE IN SUPPORT OF THIS
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PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET UNION. TODAY WE WILL EXPRESS SOME

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.

FIRST OF ALL, I HAVE TO EMPHASIZE THAT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, THESE SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR ARTICLE XIII OF THE DRAFT ARE OF INDEPENDENT SUBSTANTIAL SIGNIFICANCE. IT IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE CLEARLY THE POSITIONS OF THE SIDES ON THE MAJOR ISSUES WHOSE SCOPE IS EVIDENT AND IS CLEARLY EXPRESSED IN THE PROPOSED WORDING.

THE MAGNITUDE OF THE OBLIGATIONS WHICH FORM THE CONTENT OF ARTICLE XIII IS DUE TO A NUMBER OF HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT CIRCUMSTANCES.

IT HAS BEEN REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED AT THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE FOR THE AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS TO BE AS EFFECTIVE AND VIABLE AS POSSIBLE. IT FOLLOWS WITH COMPELLING LOGIC THAT IT IS NECESSARY FOR THE SIDES TO ASSUME OBLIGATIONS WHICH WOULD BE AIMED AT PRECLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF WEAKENING OR CIRCUMVENTING THROUGH A THIRD STATE OR THIRD STATES, OR IN ANY OTHER WAY, THE LIMITATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY THE SIDES UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.

THE MATTER OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF OBLIGATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY THE SIDES HAS FOR A LONG TIME, AND NOT BY CHANCE, BEEN WITHIN THE SPHERE OF COINCIDING VIEWS OF THE SIDES. THE SOVIET UNION'S POLICY HERE IS CLEAR AND CONSISTENT. THE UNITED STATES, TOO, HAS MORE THAN ONCE SPOKEN IN FAVOR OF SUCH AN APPROACH. ALREADY AT THE FIRST STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THE U.S. TABLED A PROPOSAL TO THE EFFECT THAT THE AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS "INCLUDE THE UNDERSTANDING THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD SEEK TO CIRCUMVENT THE PROVISIONS OR LESSEN THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE AGREEMENT THROUGH A THIRD COUNTRY." NON-CIRCUMVENTION QUESTIONS WERE CONSIDERED BY BOTH SIDES IN POSITIVE TERMS SUBSEQUENTLY AS WELL.

AND THIS IS NOT A MANIFESTATION OF SOME SORT OF EXTERNAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM, BUT A CONCLUSION ENSUING
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FROM THE INNER CONTENT OF THE SPHERE OF THE QUESTIONS BEING CONSIDERED, WHICH CONCERN THE MAIN DIRECTIONS OF THE POLICY OF CURBING THE RACE IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND CREATING CONDITIONS FOR ENSURING LASTING PEACE AND THE SECURITY OF PEOPLES.

THE NEED RELIABLY TO BLOCK POSSIBLE WAYS OF WEAKENING OR CIRCUMVENTING THE NEW AGREEMENT THROUGH A THIRD STATE

OR THIRD STATES, OR IN ANY OTHER WAY, IS DICTATED BY THE
OBJECTIVE OR PREVENTING SITUATIONS WHICH, SHOULD THEY BE
CREATED, COULD INCREASE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR
WAR. INDEED, TO LEAVE OPEN CHANNELS FOR WEAKENING OR
CIRCUMVENTING THE NEW AGREEMENT COULD, UNDER CERTAIN
CIRCUMSTANCES, SERVE AS A MOTIVATING POSSIBILITY FOR
ACTIONS WHICH RADICALLY CONFLICT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF
EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY OF THE SIDES AND LEAD TO
UNDERMINING TRUST BETWEEN OUR STATES.

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ACTION SS-25

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0400

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TO RECORD AN OBLIGATION ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION WOULD
CONSTITUTE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE POLICY UNDER WHICH
SIGNIFICANT STEPS IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS HAVE ALREADY
BEEN TAKEN, AND WHICH IS IN ACCORD WITH THE VITAL INTERESTS
OF THE PEOPLES OF BOTH COUNTRIES, AND INDEED, OF THE WHOLE
WORLD.

ACTIONS WHICH WOULD BE AIMED AT WEAKENING OR CIRCUM-
VENTING THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT THROUGH A
THIRD STATE OR THIRD STATES, OR IN ANY OTHER WAY, IN

ADDITION TO HAVING A MOST NEGATIVE EFFECT UPON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AS A WHOLE, WOULD IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS TURN AGAINST THE INTEREST OF THE SIDE WHICH WOULD HAVE VENTURED TO UNDERTAKE THEM. NO ONE HAS OR CAN HARBOR ANY ILLUSIONS ON THIS SCORE.

CONSEQUENTLY, TO PRECLUDE, UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT, THE VERY POSSIBILITY OF SUCH ACTIONS, WOULD SERVE THE INTERESTS OF STATE OF BOTH SIDES, THE INTERESTS OF ALL PEOPLES.

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THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY THE SIDES HOLDS ONE OF THE CENTRAL POSITIONS IN THE SYSTEM OF THE NORMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW; WHEN CONCLUDING IMPORTANT AGREEMENTS, PARTIES ARE GUIDED THEREBY. EMBODIMENT OF THIS PRINCIPLE BECOMES ALL THE MORE IMPORTANT--POLITICALLY AND IN PRACTICE--WITH RESPECT TO CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT DEALING WITH THE LIMITATION OF THE MOST DANGEROUS MODERN MEANS OF WAGING WAR--STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

IN FACT, TO RECORD AN OBLIGATION ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION IN THE TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT WOULD BE THE ACID TEST WHICH CONFIRMS THE READINESS OF THE SIDES STRICTLY TO ADHERE TO PRACTICAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE LIMITATIONS TO BE ESTABLISHED. AND CONVERSELY, THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A PROVISION IN THE TEXT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT COULD IN A CERTAIN RESPECT CAST DOUBT ON THE INTENTIONS OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES, AND THEREBY DETRACT FROM THE IMPORTANCE AND STANDING OF THE WHOLE AGREEMENT. NOR CAN THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH AN OBLIGATION BE UNDERESTIMATED IN TERMS OF INCREASING MUTUAL TRUST BETWEEN STATES.

THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, AT THIS STAGE, TOO, GIVES REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A PROXIMITY OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE SIDES WITH RESPECT TO THE NECESSITY AND ADVISABILITY OF ASSUMING OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT NOT TO UNDERTAKE ACTIONS WHICH COULD LEAD TO CIRCUMVENTING OR WEAKENING ITS PROVISIONS. THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR ARTICLE XIII OF THE JOINT DRAFT, TABLED AUGUST 22, 1975, TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE DISCUSSIONS HELD.

IN CONCLUSION, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE AGAIN THAT THIS PROPOSAL HOLDS AN IMPORTANT INDEPENDENT PLACE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT, AND THAT THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT REACHING AGREEMENT ON IT IS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE.

JOHNSON

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